Keywords
selected schools of new institutional economics
enterprise management
How to Cite
Abstract
The theoretical outline of the issues which constitute the essence of corporate governance research is settled in the theories of the new institutional economics. The theory of contracts, the theory of agency, economy of transaction costs and the theory of rights of ownership are presented with the phenomenon of asymmetry of information which appears in various aspects of functioning of a company. The conclusion from the analysis within this paper is the statement that corporate supervision in any company is strongly determined with the specific nature of the activities of all its parties: the hierarchy of their objectives, expectations, competencies, willingness to undertake risk, thus including also stimulation of the level of asymmetry of information, using mechanisms of compensation or motivations used for drawing benefits from using private information.
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